Questionnaire surveys we have undertaken in 1988 and annually 2003-2012 of recent homebuyers in each of four U.S. cities shed light on their expectations and reasons for buying and selling during the recent housing boom and subsequent collapse, and on the reasons for the housing crisis that initiated the current financial malaise. We find that homebuyers were generally well informed, and that their short-run expectations if anything underreacted to the year-to-year change in actual home prices. More of the root causes of the bubble can be seen in their long-term, ten-year, home price expectations, which reached abnormal levels relative to the mortgage rate at the peak of the boom and declined sharply since. The downward turning point around 2005 of the long boom that preceded the crisis was associated with changing public understanding of speculative bubbles.
I. Introduction
Between the end of World War II and the year 2000, the U.S. housing market contributed much to the strength of the macro economy. It was a major source of jobs, produced consistently rising home equity, and served as perhaps the most significant channel to the real economy for monetary policy.
But starting with a drop in the S&P/Case-Shiller index for Boston in September of 2005 house prices began to fall in city after city. By the time it was over, home prices were down as much as 32% on a national basis, with many cities down by more than 50 percent, wiping nearly $7 trillion in equity off of the household balance sheet. The production of new homes and apartments as measured by housing starts peaked in January of 2006 at 2.27 million annually and began to drop. Starts fell 79% to under 500,000 in just two years. As of July 2012 the figure remained under 800,000, a 50 year low level, for 48 months.
As prices fell, the mortgage industry collapsed and the entire financial system was shaken to its core. Even mortgages and mortgage backed securities that had been well underwritten Certainly the literature on housing bubbles is extensive and it is not our purpose to systematically review it here. What we do know is that what happens in the market depends on the behavior and attitudes of millions of individual participants, foremost among them: buyers.
We believe that one aspect of this episode in the housing market has not received the attention that it deserves: the role of expectations. What were people thinking when they bought a home? At the time of purchase, a buyer of a capital asset is buying a flow of services and benefits that will all come in the future, and the future is always uncertain.
To buy a house an individual (or a household) must make a series of very difficult decisions that will in all likelihood impact their lives forever. In virtually every case, a buyer walks into a closed room and writes a check and signs an offer sheet or a purchase and sale agreement. Anyone who has ever signed an offer sheet, read a building inspector's report, or wondered what would happen if she lost her job, knows that this decision is emotional, personal and difficult. The title of this paper focuses on the process of thinking about the future, calculating subjective costs, risk aversion and preference formation, all difficult topics for economists. It is really about what goes on in the minds of buyers, and we chose to go directly to the source.
The paper will follow the following outline. I. We will begin with a description of the survey, the questionnaire and sample sizes. II. The bulk of the paper will ask and attempt to answer a number of interesting questions that we think will add to our understanding of how the market works: The choice of questions and the methodologies used are, by the nature of the data and the lack of a rigid theoretical frame, simple and somewhat ad hoc. The roughly 5,000 respondents have one thing in common: they bought a house recently. Rather than looking only at actual behavior we chose to ask for perceptions, interpretations and opinions. We are well aware of the potential biases.
II. Our Survey of Homebuyers
To help understand the role of psychology and expectations we decided more than two decades ago to survey a sample of home buyers and ask them specifically about their reasons for buying.
We decided on a questionnaire survey of approximately 10 pages and sent it to a random sample of home buyers in four metropolitan areas: Middlesex County, MA (in the Boston-Cambridge- During the first year, 1988, the response rate was extraordinary. Of 2,030 surveys mailed in 1988 we ultimately got 886 or 43.6 percent completed and tabulated. In Case and Shiller (1988) we presented the results of that survey and concluded: "While the evidence is circumstantial, and we can only offer conjectures, we see a market largely driven by expectations. People seem to form their expectations from past price movements rather than having any knowledge of fundamentals. This means that housing price booms will persist as home buyers become destabilizing speculators." In addition, we found significant evidence that housing prices were inflexible downward at least in the absence of severe and prolonged economic decline.
In 2003, we decided to replicate the survey in the same cities with the same questionnaire to see if the market conditions and past history had changed the results. The surveys were all sent out during the spring of the respective survey years. We now have completed the process a total of 11 times, and this paper presents a first look at the aggregate results.
In 2003, the response rate was 35.4 percent of 2,000 originally mailed. The high response rate was in part the result of sending the questionnaire with a letter hand signed by both Case and
Shiller, sending a post card follow-up to non-respondents, and finally sending a second mailing. By and large, the answer is yes and you can see the evidence in Table 2 as well as Figures 1-4. Table 2 shows simple correlations between actual price behavior and perceived change.
Specifically, we take the actual change in the S&P/Case-Shiller price indices for each location and year and then see what percentage of the respondents in that year's survey said prices were "rising rapidly." We would expect to find that the percentage saying "rising rapidly" to be highly correlated with the year over year price increases for the year of the survey over the previous year.
Similarly if buyers were well informed, you would expect to see a high but negative correlation between the percent who chose "falling rapidly" and the actual price change since the previous year. The simple correlation coefficients are large and all have the right sign. The correlations are strong across all counties indicating that respondents were pretty much on target with their perceptions. The correlations weaken, although slowly at first, when you compare more distant past price changes to current perceptions. Figure 2 . In both California cities, virtually 100% of respondents thought prices were rising and the vast majority of those thought they were rising rapidly.
In Boston in 1988, there was a great deal of uncertainty. As one can see in Figure 3 the market was at or approaching a peak. People did not know what to think. A total of 37% of the respondents said price trends were "not changing" while most were split (rising slowly 34% and falling slowly 22%). House prices were sticky, and they were essentially flat, but there was a great deal of debate at the time about the likelihood of a recession and an actual price decline.
Home prices in Milwaukee rose more slowly and steadily in the late 1980s and the respondent's perceptions reflect that. Figure 4 shows some ambiguity among respondents about price trends in 1988. As with Boston, few saw price moving rapidly in either direction, but 53% did perceive prices as rising slowly and another 24% said prices were not changing. Milwaukee. For the survey overall 16% believed prices were rising in 2009. By 2010 that number had jumped to 39%, the highest level since 2006.
In 2010 there was a great deal of debate in the press about whether it was a bottom or a "dead cat bounce," a pure result of the $8,000 first time homebuyer credit, which was in effect from the Spring of 2009 to the summer of 2010 and the additional home buyer tax credits available in California. As you can see the perceptions of respondents to the survey of home buyers in 2011 were fairly gloomy. More than 50% of survey respondents thought prices were falling. But while the bulk of buyers thought prices were falling in 2011, the 2012 pattern indicated a bounce with 71% believing that that prices were rising (44%) or not changing (27%).
Perceptions in all areas rose to or above where they were in 2010. This was a period where months made a difference, the indexes did not all agree.
We conclude that over the cycle, buyers in boom cities were very much aware of contemporaneous changes in house prices and that they were, if anything, out in front of changes that were occurring. When house prices turn down buyers are cognizant of it. As an aside it is interesting to note that the pattern of responses from San Francisco and Orange County were remarkably similar. In fact they were virtually identical. They showed certainty about direction in 1988, 2004, and 2008 with substantial uncertainty in 2006, 2011, and 2012. Notice also the answers to the other question on Figures 1 through 4 . When asked about whether they agreed with the statement "It is a good time to buy because prices are likely to rise in the future." Virtually everyone said that they agreed. In every single survey at least 67% of respondents agreed and for most the count was over 80%. Buyers are optimists.
B. Have home buyers expectations been rational and how have they been formed?
Many stories of the housing boom in the early years of the 2000s describe it as a bubble driven by irrational expectations. People are alleged to have been excessively optimistic. Our data allow us to refine such notions, as we began to do in our 2003 Brookings paper, and as we can do now even better with the expectations data our survey provides over the full course of the bubble, its peak, and its collapse.
Two questions in our survey help us to assess buyers' rationality. Question 6 of the questionnaire asks that you state how much your house is likely to increase or decrease in value over the next 12-months. Question 7 asks what do you think will happen to the value of your house each year over the next ten years. Table 3 shows the raw values of trimmed mean calculations for every year from 2003 through 2012. One way to think of them is that they represent the expected value of the average increase in house price over the next year -the short run expected annual gain -and the expected value of the average increase in price each year for the next 10 years -the long run expected annual gain. What can be said about the patterns that we observe here? First of all, to some the expectation of price increases in excess of 10 percent per year for 10 years seems absurd. But when you look at what was happening after 2000 one is struck by the data. If you compute the rates of appreciation between 1996 and 2006 just prior to the peak, the data show that the CaseShiller 10-City composite index appreciated nearly 11% per year for the 10 year period. Indeed more than half of our city specific indexes show 10 years of returns in excess of 10%. This was taking place precisely as the expectations that we are describing in our survey were being formed.
If you look at Figure We see that there is a large difference between the one-year and ten-year expectations data.
The one-year expectations are much more volatile, and at times have shown negative expected growth over the next year. Ten-year expectations, on the other hand, have a simpler pattern, peaking around 2004 and then gradually, but only slowly, declining. Buyers are also more optimistic about long-term price changes, thus ten-year expectations exceed one-year expectations across all years and counties.
Both kinds of expectations are important. Home sellers will have an incentive to wait another year to sell if one-year expectations are high, while buyers have an incentive to buy now rather than next year. But, in making a general decision whether to buy at all or not, and for judging the overall long-term investment return compared with the mortgage rate, the longerterm expectations are likely to be more important.
Figure 5: Home Prices and their Expectations
Source: S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices for all but Milwaukee, for which a Fiserv (Case-Shiller) Home Price Index is used, and authors' calculations from survey results. 
We can test whether the expectations are rational by regressing the actual future home price change onto the expected change, though with our data we can do this only for the one-year expectations, since we do not have ten-years' subsequent price data to do this with the ten-year expectations. Under traditional rational expectations theory, the constant term should be zero and the slope coefficient equal to a positive one. We find, Table 1a , that for the one-year expectations data in all cities the slope coefficients are significant, and have the right sign, but are always much greater than one. (The constant term is always negative, reflecting a necessary correction for the mean when the slope coefficient is greater than one.) This may be interpreted as implying that homeowners had information that is relevant to the forecast, but that they were not aggressive enough in their forecasts of twelve-month changes. Scatter diagrams of actual and forecasted price changes for the four cities, Figure 3 , convey how much individuals underestimated the absolute magnitude of home price movements.
Contrary to what one might expect from popular stories about bubble mentality, the oneyear expectations are not overreacting to information, but under-reacting to information. But, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the presence of a bubble. Certainly, the longer-term expectations, whose rationality is harder to judge, seem likely to have been overreacting to information in the early years of our sample when they were predicting over ten-percent a year appreciation for the next ten years. Much of this apparent underreaction of expectations to information about future home prices is confined to certain cities and episodes. Note that in the tamer cities Milwaukee and Boston, the coefficients in Table 4a (using the S&P/Case-Shiller data) are 1.50 or less and not significantly different from 1.00, and while the coefficients are slightly higher in Table 4b (using the FHFA data), they still are not significantly different from one. Moreover, if we delete observations with actual price changes above +10% and below -7%, reducing the number of observations from 36 to 26, the slope coefficient for all four cities together falls to 0.71, with a standard error of .41, significantly less than one. Note that all ten of the removed observations are located in the more volatile California counties.
We can also test rational expectations further by adding to the Table 1a regression other information variables, available to home buyers when the expectation was made, and expecting to see that these other variables should have a coefficient of zero if the expectations are rational.
These regressions are reported in Table 5 . We try two other information variables: the actual lagged 12-month price change in the same city and the actual lagged 12-month price change for the U.S., as measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Home Price Index. Both of these variables' coefficients do come out insignificant. The dependent variable is the percentage home price change in the city from the second quarter of the year to the second quarter of the following (future) year. The first independent variable is the expected future 12-month price change from our surveys, the second is past annual price change from the same city, and the third is the past annual U.S. national home price change (S&P/CaseShiller 10-City Index). Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients have the opposite of the positive sign we might have expected, but are insignificant. This confirms the rational expectations for the 12-month forecasts. Respondents do appear to incorporate this other information in making the 12-month forecasts.
In Table 6 we reverse the sides of the regression and reverse the time lag, and regress the 12-month expectation on the lagged actual 12-month price change, to see if there is a simple structure to expectations. The R squared in the regression is substantial, ranging between 0.64 and 0.87. Of course, the slope coefficient is far less than one, for, as we have noted, expectations are much less volatile than actual price changes.
Thus, the 12-month expectations are fairly well described as attenuated versions of lagged actual 12-month price changes, and yet we know from Table 2 that they also contain significant additional information about future price changes beyond what is contained in the lagged actual price change.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that we should deduce that any story of feedback in determining price should be modeled in rational terms. The long-term expectation also matters importantly for demand for housing, and the long-term expectation is important to the way that people judge whether to buy a home.
It is, as was suggested by Keynes in his 1936 General Theory of Employment Interest and
Money, the long-term expectations that may be the real driver of the speculative boom, and the long-term expectations are not normally the focal point of economic forecasters. It is the general expectation for the vague and distant future that helps explain why people behaved as if they thought that home price can never fall: perhaps they thought so only about the long run, as our 10-year expectations data seem to confirm. Some simple stories come to mind, that cannot be proven or disproven with any data that we know of. One is that expectations of long-term home price increases were formed over many decades, over times when home prices pretty consistently increased. Money illusion may play a role: people may forget to consider that with lower overall inflation now home price increases ought to be smaller than in the past.
Notably, the peak in expectations occurs two years before price began to fall, three years Most respondents wrote in an answer to these questions: only a few left them blank. The questionnaires left space for writing twenty or so words, and many filled the space. Only a few wrote one-word answers.
C. How did the bubble end?
There is one major turning point in our sample period, a sudden historic end of the housing bubble. Although we have only one observation of this turning point, understanding it is central to our objectives.
Comparing the responses to questions 16 and 17 between the years 2004 and 2006 seems likely to be fruitful for understanding turning points, for long-term expectations dropped a full four percentage points over that interval, roughly half of the total drop in expectations since the peak in expectations, and over a relatively short interval of time. The answers cannot be clouded by any references to the financial crisis, which was still entirely in the future.
Between these two years, there was a striking change in the tenor of the answers. The common themes in 2004 were strongly emphasizing a "shortage of houses," a large number of "immigrants," "scarcity of land," "lack of building space," "too many people," "the desire to have it all," that the city "is expensive and always will be." Only occasionally did they mention The questionnaire itself did not use the word bubble, except at the end of the 2010 questionnaire, the last question (among the special questions that we stick on at the end of the questionnaire, without changing the questions above it in the questionnaire):
38. Do you think the home price boom and bust in first decade of the 2000s was basically a speculative bubble and burst (prices driven up by greed and excessive speculation and then inevitably collapsing down)? forming about real estate bubbles, but strongly rejected it. He argued that lower interest rates meant that housing was much more affordable than it was in the previous couple decades, and that the baby boom was still going strong for years to come. He was right about these points, though it was still a leap of judgment to conclude, as he did, that the current market offered a "once-in-every-other generation opportunity" for investors.
In March 2005 one of us, Shiller, published the second edition of his book Irrational Exuberance which included a new data set on real home prices since 1890. No such long data set of U.S. home prices had ever been published before, and the chart revealed that by historical standards the real estate boom was highly abnormal, "like a rocket taking off." The chart was reprinted in a number of places, including the New York Times.
On June 16, 2005, The Economist published a cover story entitled "After the Fall," illustrated on the cover by a painting of a falling brick inscribed with the words "house prices."
In that story it said:
PERHAPS the best evidence that America's house prices have reached dangerous levels is the fact that house-buying mania has been plastered on the front of virtually every American newspaper and magazine over the past month. Such bubble-talk hardly comes as a surprise to our readers. We have been warning for some time that the price of housing was rising at an alarming rate all around the globe, including in America. Now that others have noticed as well, the day of reckoning is closer at hand. It is not going to be pretty. How the current housing boom ends could decide the course of the entire world economy over the next few years.
Indeed, it does appear that the news media had flocked to the notion that the housing boom was really a bubble. Time Magazine published a cover story "Why We're Going Gaga over Real
Estate" with a painting of a man lovingly hugging a house on June 13. Barron's ran a cover story by Jonathan Laing entitled "The Bubble's New Home" on June 20.
And why did this media event happen so suddenly? It must have something to do with the behavior of news media, who are always looking to resonant stories, stories that readers will want to follow, and hence they follow each other in discovering such stories. Somehow the bubble story became such a story around that time, and it ushered in a turning point in public thinking.
That people were changing their thinking about housing bubbles in mid-2005 can also be measured by a Google Trends count of web searches for the term "housing bubble." As can be seen from Figure 9 , there was in 2005 a sudden dramatic burst in web searches for this term, peaking in August.
Even many months after public opinion had begun to turn so decisively towards a view that the recent boom in home prices was a bubble, some economists continued to argue that all price increases were justified by fundamentals and that there was no bubble. Margaret Hwang Smith there are many different ways to ask whether speculative price changes are "justified," and that the issues in financial theory are sufficiently complex that it is hard to be definitive, and yet that there are reasons to suspect that the price changes we actually see are related to public swings in opinions rather than fundamentals (Shiller 2006 ). The total cost of the program was estimated to be $22 billion.
2
The tax credits came at the beginning of a new presidency, when other stimulus programs were announced, which may have amplified the sense of hope that they offered. A search through our questionnaires (filled out around the middle of the year) for the words "tax credit" produced 3 hits in 2009, 37 hits in 2010, 10 hits in 2011, and 2 hits in 2012. In 2010, all but one of the 37 hits came from first-time homebuyers. The questionnaire for 2010 differed from all 1 There was also a $7,500 tax credit with the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, but that credit had to be repaid, and so was really a loan rather than a subsidy.
2 U.S. General Accountability Office 2010. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101025r.pdf. Since two of our four cities are in California, it is worth noting that California had its own $10,000 home buyer tax credits. The first was in effect from Mar 1, 2009 and February 28, 2010 . It was not limited to first-time buyers but was limited to newly built homes. The second California credit went to home buyers between May 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010 . It allocated $100 million to first-time home buyers and an additional $100 million to purchasers of new homes. Both were distributed on a first come first-served basis. In per capita terms, the California program is less than a tenth the size of the federal program.
other years' questionnaires in that it asked (question 22b, well after questions 16 and 17) "Are you getting the home buyer tax credit for this home purchase?" and so may have reminded respondents, those who did not answer all questions in order, of this fact.
A remarkably high fraction of respondents answered in 2010 that they would get a home buyer tax credit: 80% of our respondents in Orange County, 65% in Boston and Milwaukee, and These results suggest that the homebuyer tax credit was an important factor in the temporary turnaround in the housing market: not only were home buyers aware of it, they also bought hurriedly, and with its support, thereby setting the stage for a decline in home prices in 2011, possibly unrelated to expectations of future price increases.
A couple of theories come to mind to explain why homebuyers suddenly came into the market then, bought hurriedly then. One theory is that they were convinced by the decisive government action in the tax credit and thought then that home prices would quickly go up. But, this theory is belied by our expectations data, seen in Figure Another theory of the effects of the tax credit relies on the psychological theory of regret.
The homebuyer tax credit was a reason for home buyers to act here and now to buy a house.
Missing the homebuyer tax credit, and perhaps buying soon after it expired, would generate a pang of regret. Regret theory, advanced by Loomis and Sugden (1982) , argues that people are especially motivated to avoid the feeling of regret for having missed an opportunity or made a mistake, and that the regret itself looms large in their mind, sometimes out of proportion to the actual loss [Loomis, Graham, and Robert Sugden (1982) 
IV. Conclusion
The rise and fall of the housing market during the past decade has been one of the most important events in modern economic history. This paper focuses on a factor that has received little formal analysis: The role of expectations. The paper is an attempt to draw some conclusions out of a set of nearly 5,000 completed mail surveys collected over the past 25 years from actual home buyers in 4 cities. The descriptions of the data and the questions that we ask may seem somewhat ad hoc and arbitrary, but no theoretical frame exists to guide us.
We can say a few things in conclusion. First, the data suggest that home buyers were very much aware of trends in house prices at the time they make a purchase. There is a strong correlation between the descriptions that the respondents give to their perceptions of price trends and actual movements in prices. The data also show that the opinions of buyers vary over time.
When trends are strong, there is little disagreement among respondents. Where there is ambiguity, respondents naturally seem to have a much less clear picture of trends.
The data also show that buyers were, if anything, out in front of short-term changes that were occurring and that homebuyers short-run expectations under-reacted to the year-to-year changes in actual home prices. We cannot test the rationality of long-term expectations as we can with short-term expectations, and yet, since most home buyers own their homes for many years, these are arguably the more important determinants of housing demand. It is from these nebulous and relatively slow-moving expectations that the bubble took much of its impetus, and that future home price movements will as well.
Long-term expectations have been consistently more optimistic than short-term expectations across both time and location, but the magnitude of the differences fell from a high of 8.3% in 2008 to just 0.8% in 2012.
Perceptions of where prices are headed turned more positive and expected short term appreciation in home prices improved in 2012. But, at the same time, long-term expectations continue weaken. Thus, while a recovery may be plausible, and home prices have been rising fairly strongly in recent months, we do not see any unambiguous indication in our expectations data of sharp upward turning point in demand for housing that some observers, and media accounts, have suggested. 1. My house is worth more than people seem to be willing to pay right now 2. I can't afford to sell at a lower price 3. By holding out, I will be able to get more later 
